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REPORT

on the **UN**

Thomas J. Hamilton

Vera Micheles Dean

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HEADLINE SERIES

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Report on the United Nations

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1. From San Francisco to Berlin	3
2. Security Council Record	13
3. Arms and the Atom	30
4. Beyond the Veto	44
5. Basic Issues	52

A Future for the UN?

Vera Micheles Dean

56

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REPORT on the United Nations

by Thomas J. Hamilton

1. From San Francisco to Berlin

THREE AND A HALF years of the postwar era have dealt harshly with the United Nations. Its prestige, after a serious decline, was somewhat restored during the early months of 1949, but it is now obvious that the organization must concentrate on the mediation of international disputes and on a long-range effort to remove the basic causes of war, rather than on an attempt to enforce a settlement between East and West. The bickerings at San Francisco four years ago over the terms of the Charter were followed by still more serious differences among the great powers after the organization was formally established in London with the opening of the General Assembly on January 10, 1946. Two and a half years later the United Nations returned temporarily to Europe: the Paris session of the General Assembly, lasting from September 21 to December 12, 1948, not only failed to solve some of the outstanding questions before the organization but precipitately adjourned for Christmas, leaving several vital issues to be taken up at the spring session which convened at Flushing Meadow on April 5.


Even more damaging from the point of view of United Nations prestige were the subsequent meetings of the Security Council, held in Paris for two weeks after the Assembly adjourned. The

Council failed to take effective action to halt either the Israeli offensive in Palestine or the Dutch offensive in Indonesia.

For the most part the failures of the United Nations can be attributed to the policy of the Soviet Union. The paralysis of the UN's security functions is reflected in the tendency of the United States and the nations on its side to take action outside the United Nations in some matters which seem to be within its jurisdiction. As long ago as March 1947 President Truman announced the Truman doctrine, under which the United States is supplying arms to Greece and Turkey to bolster them against a possible Communist attack, with the statement that the situation was too pressing to permit action through the United Nations. And the European Recovery Program, initiated by Secretary of State Marshall's speech at Harvard in June 1947, has developed outside the United Nations, despite the hopes expressed at San Francisco that the organization would deal extensively with economic affairs. Above all, the decision of the United States to go ahead with the North Atlantic pact in the spring of 1949 diminished the prestige of the United Nations—even though a majority of the fifty-eight members felt that this was an unavoidable necessity. Nevertheless, there is a considerable weight of opinion that it was the *necessity* for such an agreement, not the fact that it was brought into force, which caused the damage. Subsequent developments, moreover, indicated that the treaty is likely, as its sponsors claim, to stabilize the international situation—and thus strengthen the United Nations indirectly.

The treaty specifically invokes Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, safeguarding the right of both individual and collective self-defense against armed attack by members of the United Nations. This right, however, is to be exercised only pending action by the Security Council, and in the relatively halcyon days of the San Francisco conference it was generally assumed that this would mean not more than a few days' delay. But with relations as they now are between the Soviet Union and the Western powers, the North Atlantic treaty is based on

'MILLSTONE'



Carmack in *The Christian Science Monitor*

the premise that the Soviet veto would prevent any action by the Security Council in an important dispute.

The State Department gave prolonged consideration to such a mutual defense agreement, which would function independently of the action or non-action of the Security Council, as early as 1947. The final decision to sponsor the North Atlantic


treaty appears to have been taken in the summer of 1948, and at the General Assembly in Paris Secretary Marshall had an opportunity to discuss the situation with many foreign ministers at the very time that a Soviet veto prevented the Security Council from taking action on the Berlin blockade.

Since the Berlin dispute was the most important issue with which the organization has yet been confronted, the significance of its failure to produce a settlement satisfactory to the two sides cannot be overemphasized. Aside from the merits on this particular issue, the deadlock on Berlin demonstrated that the Soviet Union and the Western powers were increasingly unwilling, or unable, to work together within the framework of the United Nations—or anywhere else. However, on May 4, 1949, the Big Four representatives of the United Nations reached an agreement whereby the Soviet blockade and the counter-measures imposed by the Western powers would be raised simultaneously and the Council of Foreign Ministers would meet to take up the German problem as a whole. Although this agreement was not achieved as the result of any direct action by the United Nations, the first contact between the United States and the Soviet Union was made in the delegate's lounge at Lake Success, and the success of the negotiations was a valuable stimulant to the morale of both delegates and secretariat.

Trend in General Assembly

The General Assembly, on the whole, has a less discouraging record than the Security Council. Nevertheless, the Paris session of the Assembly in the autumn of 1948 did nothing—actually there was little it could do—to solve the major issues in dispute between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies, in particular the United States. Possibly it may have helped to alleviate international tension, which was dangerously acute when the Assembly convened, for the small and medium powers made it plain during the session that they preferred a more moderate course than that urged by the United States delegation. In the

A UNITED NATION'S DILEMMA



GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

end, however, they backed the United States on all the important questions, and the Soviet Union, for the first time since the establishment of the United Nations, failed to win Assembly approval on a single major issue.

The mere defeat of Soviet proposals, however, is hardly the most satisfactory basis for an enduring peace. In Paris, even more than at previous sessions of the Assembly, the Soviet bloc found itself in a minority of six out of fifty-eight, just as it has long been in a minority of two out of eleven on the Security Council. But since the Assembly's resolutions have no binding force upon member governments, its powers will always remain limited. Perhaps the principal result of the decision to hold its 1948 session in Paris was the tardy realization by the people of Europe that the Assembly is limited to recommendations only.

This fundamental limitation on the powers of the Assembly, coupled with the fact that the Western majority in the Security Council is checkmated by the Soviet veto, has thus confronted the United Nations with a difficult situation. Its gravity was symbolized by the signing of the North Atlantic pact in Washington on April 4, just one day before the Assembly opened its 1949 spring session.

The size of the American military budget and the fact that the United States felt it necessary last year to reimpose conscription is itself a sufficient commentary upon the present state of the United Nations—or, what amounts to the same thing, the relations between East and West. The preamble of the Charter states as its first objective the determination of “we the peoples” of the United Nations “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind,” but it now appears that we must rely upon our own strength, together with the regional blocs we are helping to organize, almost as if there were no United Nations.

The League and the UN

Matters were far different at this stage in the history of the League of Nations. To be sure, the end of every wartime coalition inevitably produces differences among the victorious powers. The years which followed the end of the First World War produced the Greco-Turkish war, the Allied intervention in Russia, and—even more disturbing from a long-range point of view—Italy’s seizure of Fiume and bombardment of Corfu. Nevertheless, there was a widespread belief that the League was an infallible guarantee against any general war, and the twenties and early thirties brought general disarmament on a scale which, in the light of present-day conditions, seems unbelievably Utopian.

The collapse of the authority of the League of Nations, which began when it failed to do anything to stop the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, was completed by similar failures when Mussolini invaded Ethiopia, Hitler and Mussolini inter-

WILL HISTORY REPEAT ITSELF?

The League failed because:

1. U.S. and Russia (until 1934) did not join



Is UN doing better?

Both U.S. and Russia are UN members, but . . .



2. The League had no army to enforce its decisions




UN planned to create international force, but . . .



3. National interest came before international welfare



The same nationalism is still with us



GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

vened in Spain, and Hitler annexed Austria and Czechoslovakia. Much has been made of the structural defects in the League Covenant, in particular the unanimity rule in both the Assembly and the Council. This was certainly a basic cause for its failure,

but other factors which also played their part, included the following: (1) neither the Soviet Union (until 1934) nor the United States was a member, and the absence of these two great powers inevitably weakened the League's authority; (2) the League had no military force of its own; (3) the attempts of the great powers to safeguard their individual interests blocked effective international action, and the peoples of the democratic countries in general deluded themselves with the notion that each case of unchecked Fascist aggression, although admittedly "a blow to the League," did not concern them as citizens of the peace-loving countries which together constituted the League.

The United Nations Charter was drafted in the hope that the defects which had been revealed in the League Covenant could be avoided. The United States government made it clear long before the end of the war that it intended to sponsor a new international organization, and it joined with the governments of Britain, the Soviet Union and China in preparing the preliminary Dumbarton Oaks proposals and in holding the San Francisco conference.

The Charter directed the Security Council to organize an international police force, or, more exactly, to call on the Big Five and other member countries to supply armed forces which would operate, on call, directly under the orders of the Security Council. The small and medium powers were not allowed the right of veto in either the Security Council or the General Assembly. The "principle of unanimity" of the Big Five—in other words, the veto—was established as a check upon the otherwise unlimited powers of the Security Council.

It is all too easy, looking back at San Francisco in the light of four years of great power disputes, to argue that it was unrealistic to expect constant and ungrudging co-operation among the Big Five. The prospects of such co-operation, moreover, were not increased by the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union emerged after V-J Day as the two supreme powers of the postwar world. Britain, France and China also were given per-

manent seats on the Security Council and the right of veto, but Britain had been weakened more than anyone suspected, and France and China were great powers by courtesy only. In the virtual absence of competitors, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union deteriorated until they now find themselves in an all-out struggle for power throughout the world.

This struggle is now the dominant fact of our time, but the violence of its outward manifestations is attributable more to the suspicions of the Kremlin, which in turn have bred suspicions in Washington, than to ineluctable necessity. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union has used its thirty vetoes in the Security Council to counterbalance its minority status, has blocked international atomic control and the establishment of an international police force along the lines desired by the United States and the UN majority, and in general has provoked precisely the countermeasures which it feared would be used against it.

To be sure the United States and the Soviet Union, although naturally with different objectives and different tactics, have been roughly on the same side in both the Palestine and Indonesian crises. For that matter, the three Western powers were not solidly together on the Berlin-German question, for both France and Britain at the start were unwilling to accept the United States decision to push matters to a decision, and the French, who do not like General Clay's policy of rebuilding Germany, were still dragging their feet. In other words, the great powers, as during the League days, are repeating the effort to safeguard their individual interests, and far too many citizens of countries belonging to the United Nations shrug their shoulders over its failures. They forget that the United Nations, like the League, is simply composed of its member nations. For this reason a setback for the United Nations is not simply a defeat for some abstract and remote organization, it is also a defeat for the individual men and women who constitute the nations holding United Nations membership.

This fact was generally realized in the United States at the

time of the San Francisco conference, but the defeats sustained by the United Nations since have tended to obscure it. Many Americans now dismiss the organization as a mere "debating society," forgetting that this in itself is an extremely valuable function. There are ample grounds for satisfaction in the fact that the United Nations debates have helped educate world opinion on the disputes that have emerged since the end of the war. The fact that these debates are taking place offers welcome assurance that words will not be replaced by bullets for some time to come. But the violence of these debates, together with the failure of the Security Council in many cases to take decisive action, is enough to inspire misgivings over the future of the organization unless some sort of *modus vivendi* can be reached between the United States and the Soviet Union.

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2. Security Council Record

THE UNITED NATIONS Charter makes a distinction between situations and disputes threatening international peace and security (Chapter VI), and threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression (Chapter VII). Although several attempts have been made to invoke Chapter VII, all resolutions thus far passed by the Security Council, with one exception (Palestine), have been based on Chapter VI. The basic limitation on the Council's powers, in keeping with the less serious nature of the disputes brought under Chapter VI, is that it does not have the power to order parties to a dispute to comply with its recommendations; neither does it have the power to order sanctions of any kind. Under Chapter VII, of course, the Council can order sanctions of increasing gravity, finally going as far as the actual use of force, to compel an aggressor to comply with its decisions—or at least to stop fighting.

Early Successes

THE IRANIAN QUESTION: The Security Council, holding its first meeting in London on January 17, 1946, could scarcely have begun its work with a more difficult problem. The Soviet Union had refused to withdraw its troops from northern Iran in accordance with the deadline fixed by a wartime treaty; although Iran was on the winning side during the war, the situation was directly attributable to the fact that the peace settlements had not been made, or even begun. This delay was of course the direct result of the disagreements which arose among the great

powers after the victory over Germany and Japan, and which have since grown steadily worse.

The extent of great power disagreements, however, at first came as a shock to those who had hoped that the successor to the League would bring about something approaching a new heaven and a new earth. The Security Council debates served as an unwelcome reminder that the long-standing competition between Britain and Russia for control of Iran and its oil fields had not disappeared with the advent of the United Nations.

Moreover, international tension was increased by the fact that the Soviet Union, in reply to the action of the United States and Britain in appealing the Iranian question to the Security Council, demanded that the Council order British troops out of Greece and Indonesia. Simultaneously the Soviet propaganda machine began a campaign for the cession of the Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan, and Soviet representatives made a formal proposal to Turkey that the Soviet Union be given bases in the Dardanelles. Tension increased when the Security Council transferred its sessions to New York and Andrei A. Gromyko, the Soviet representative, walked out of the Council in protest against discussion of the Iranian question.

Mr. Gromyko would no doubt have returned to cast a veto if there had ever been any likelihood of a Security Council resolution calling on the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops. On the other hand, the Council debates, not for the last time, had the positive value of arousing the public opinion of the world on the issues involved. Soviet troops finally left Iran, although the Soviet Union first extorted concessions from the Teheran government which it hoped would give it control over northern Iran. Since the Soviet Union has never notified the Security Council of the withdrawal, the Iranian question is still on the Council's agenda. Nevertheless, the evacuation of Soviet troops is a fact, and the influence of the Council debates is equally indisputable.

LEBANON AND SYRIA: A Soviet veto—the first of a long series—

TROUBLE SPOTS FOR THE UN



GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

prevented the Council from passing a resolution calling for the withdrawal of British and French troops from Lebanon and Syria. However, the two democracies announced that they felt themselves morally bound by the resolution and did in fact take their forces out of the two Middle Eastern countries.

Procedure Develops

In the three ensuing years the Council has scored only one clear-cut victory—its success in stopping the fighting in Kashmir—and its failures have been manifold. Nevertheless, certain precedents were established, notably during the early months of its

work, which have smoothed out its proceedings. These include:

(1) In accordance with the San Francisco declaration by the five great powers, it was finally determined that the veto does not apply to placing a question on the Council's agenda or to subsequent discussion; (2) the custom was adopted of keeping questions which had not been formally disposed of, such as Iran, on the "passive" agenda so that they could be brought up again with a minimum of formality; (3) the power of the Secretary-General to make recommendations to the Council under Article 99 of the Charter was confirmed, even though the Council brushed aside Mr. Lie's first recommendation—that the Council should remove the Iranian question from its agenda; (4) during 1947 the Council established the rule that the abstention of a great power does not constitute a veto.

This last decision, as Argentine representatives never tire of pointing out, is contrary to the clear language of the Charter, which says that decisions on other than procedural questions must be taken with the concurring votes of the Big Five. However, it has proved its usefulness, for it has relieved the four other great powers of the necessity of copying the Soviet Union's method of defeating unacceptable resolutions. They do not veto, they abstain, and since the Charter requires a two-thirds majority of the entire membership for any resolution (seven out of eleven members), their abstentions have defeated a large number of Soviet proposals. The Soviet Union used the same device to defeat the key United States resolution on the Indonesian question.

These precedents no doubt will prove of great value if the Council is able to overcome its more fundamental difficulties and do really effective work. Such issues as Palestine have been before the Council for months and years and have involved a bewildering number of United Nations agencies. It is therefore more useful to group them by subjects, in an ascending scale of importance, rather than in chronological order.

War-Like 'Incidents'

CORFU CHANNEL MINING: Despite the undeclared wars which have broken out in all sections of the globe, the Corfu Channel "incident" is the only example of the old time *casus belli* with which the Council has yet been confronted. Two British destroyers struck mines in the channel, running between the Greek island of Corfu and the Albanian mainland, with heavy loss of life, and Britain appealed the question to the Security Council after failing to get satisfaction from Albania through direct negotiations. Despite Albanian denials of responsibility, a majority of the Council voted for a resolution finding that the mines could not have been laid without the knowledge or connivance of the Albanian government. This resolution, however, was vetoed by the Soviet Union.

Finally the Council referred the question to the International Court of Justice at The Hague, which recently handed down an opinion in favor of Britain. In view of the obvious fact that the Council is not a legal organ, and that the Court was established by the United Nations to handle legal questions, this would appear to have been the only possible solution of a dispute of this kind.

Dispute Over a Prewar Treaty

THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN TREATY: Under this treaty, signed in 1936 to remain in effect until 1956, Britain retained the right to station about 10,000 troops in the area adjacent to the Suez Canal, and effective British control over the Sudan—theoretically under the joint control of Britain and Egypt—was confirmed. After the war Egypt demanded the complete evacuation of British troops from both Egypt and the Sudan, together with exclusive Egyptian administration of the Sudan. Britain and Egypt reached agreement on the question of troops, but the British stood firm on the Sudan, since Khartoum is a vital part of the air defense strategy evolved by Britain as a substitute for the system of Mediterranean naval bases. Egypt thereupon ap-

pealed the question to the Security Council in the summer of 1947.

The failure of the Security Council to do anything was attributable, not to the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the Western powers, but to the fact that the Colombian representative refused to support a compromise Brazilian resolution which was acceptable to both sides. As a result the Brazilian resolution failed of passage by one vote although it was supported by both the United States and the Soviet Union. By the time the Colombian representative had agreed to support the Brazilian proposal, the necessary majority had melted away, and the dispute is still unsolved.

An Axis Partner

SPAIN: The inability of the League of Nations to halt German and Italian intervention in the Spanish civil war was one of the final blows to the League's prestige, and the United Nations has found itself equally unable to take effective action against the Fascist government which was established in Spain with Axis help. With the defeat of Hitler and Mussolini, Franco was the last surviving Fascist ruler in Europe, and many delegates felt that his overthrow was needed to consolidate the victory.

A series of United Nations declarations had already barred the Franco government from membership in the organization, and in the spring of 1946 Poland brought the question before the Security Council on the ground that the Fascist regime constituted a threat to international peace and security under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Both an economic and a diplomatic boycott were demanded.

A Council subcommittee, headed by Dr. Herbert V. Evatt, Australian Minister of External Affairs, found that the Franco government was a potential but not an actual threat. The subcommittee's report was watered down by the United States and Britain, and Mr. Gromyko, arguing that the proposed resolution did not go far enough, cast three vetoes (a record up to that

time) on one hot summer afternoon at Hunter College. Poland then placed the question before the General Assembly, with equally ineffective results. (See page 43).

Aftermath of the War

THE BALKANS: Whereas the remaining countries of the Balkans were liberated from the Axis by Soviet troops and their governments as a result came under Soviet control, Greece was liberated by British troops, and these remained behind to support the Greek government when a civil war broke out. The Athens government contended that the guerrilla movement was Communist-inspired and that the guerrillas received help from Greece's Communist-controlled northern neighbors (Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria) and appealed the question to the Security Council under Chapter VII. The Soviet Union, perhaps because of the protests voiced at the autumn session of the 1946 General Assembly against the abuse of the veto, abstained and permitted the Security Council to send out an investigating commission under Chapter VI. However, it vetoed a subsequent Council resolution to continue the commission, which had reported that the Greek guerrillas were receiving help from Greece's three northern neighbors.

The United States then turned to the General Assembly, which in 1947 established its own investigating agency. This committee repeated the charges made by its predecessor, and the Paris Assembly extended its life for another year and called on the four Balkan countries to settle their differences by negotiations under the direction of the President of the Assembly and the Secretary General. Nothing has come of these negotiations.

TRIESTE: The Security Council, as it was requested to do under the peace treaty with Italy, assumed the responsibility for maintaining the territorial independence and integrity of the Free Territory of Trieste. This involved the selection of a governor—and this appointment was subject to the veto. The Soviet Union and the three Western powers were never able to agree.

In 1949 the Soviet Union finally offered to accept a Swiss who had originally been nominated by Britain, presumably with the acquiescence of the United States and France. By this time, however, the Western powers had decided that Trieste should be returned to Italy and refused to agree. In the background, of course, was the prospect that the selection of a governor would mean the withdrawal of the 10,000 troops which the United States and Britain together have stationed in Trieste.

Dispute Over Germany

BERLIN: When the Big Four cannot agree among themselves there is small prospect that the United Nations can settle their differences. The deadlock in the Security Council over the Berlin blockade was a particularly clear illustration of this fact. Under the Potsdam agreement Berlin was divided into four sectors, each under the administration of one of the Big Four, just as the remainder of Germany was divided into four separate occupation zones. Joint policies were to be established by the four occupation commanders.

As the split between East and West deepened, the differences among the commanders increased; in the spring of 1948 the Soviet authorities blocked land and water communications between Berlin and the Western zones and the Western commanders introduced the Western mark in their sectors of Berlin, where previously the Soviet mark had been the sole currency. Long negotiations in Moscow finally produced the agreement of August 30, 1948, which took the form of a directive to the military commanders providing that the Western mark should be withdrawn from circulation, and in return the Soviet Union would raise the blockade. The commanders were not able, however, to agree on means of establishing a single financial policy to go along with a single unit of currency, and the Western powers appealed the question to the Security Council in September as a threat to the peace under Chapter VII.

The legal basis of the dispute was not placed before the Coun-

cil, for the Western powers insisted that, regardless of the legal position, the Soviet Union's use of force was contrary to the Charter. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, denied the jurisdiction of the United Nations on the ground that the Charter forbade interference with measures adopted regarding ex-enemy states. On this basis Andrei Y. Vishinsky, then the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, vetoed a resolution introduced by the six members of the Security Council not directly concerned—a resolution providing that the blockade should be lifted, that the Soviet mark be introduced as the sole currency, and that then a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers (of the Big Four) would be held. Dr. Juan A. Bramuglia, Foreign Minister of Argentina, who was then President of the Council, continued his efforts and finally established a committee of "neutral" experts to try to work out an independent solution.

The committee, meeting at Geneva, later produced a plan which the Soviet representative accepted as a basis of discussion. The three Western powers, however, pointing out that the Soviet Union had taken steps to split Berlin in the months following the August 30 agreement, rejected it, and later withdrew the Soviet mark from circulation in their sectors. The committee thereupon suspended its work. It had been demonstrated, meanwhile, that the Anglo-American airlift, developed to supply the Western garrisons and later expanded to provide the indispensable necessities for 2 million inhabitants of the Western sectors, could be kept going even during the winter and therefore indefinitely. The Western powers obviously had no intention of giving in, and long before the Soviet Union did so, in the spring of 1949, it was clear that it was not merely because the issue had been brought before the Security Council. The two reasons for the Soviet decision to lift the blockade appeared to be: (1) The Russians had met a defeat in Berlin; (2) They hoped to use the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers as a forum for an appeal for German support.

Colonies Emerge as Nations


KASHMIR: This dispute, an indirect product of the withdrawal of Britain from India in 1947, finally produced a resounding triumph for the United Nations. The question was whether Kashmir, which had a Hindu Maharajah and a Mohammedan majority, should be annexed by Hindu India or by Pakistan. The Maharajah decided for India, thereby precipitating serious bloodshed; the Indian government accused Pakistan of intervening, and for months it appeared that the dispute between the two new dominions would result in a war that might involve hundreds of millions of people.

The Security Council's efforts to settle the dispute got off to an unpromising start. Despite its request for a cease-fire, the fighting continued. Even after it died down, there seemed to be little prospect that the Council's commission could induce India and Pakistan to agree to accept the results of a plebiscite. Finally, in January 1949 they did agree to accept a plebescite. Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz was named by Secretary-General Lie to supervise the voting, and the outlook is definitely promising.

HYDERABAD: This case also involved the status of a princely state, for the Nizam at first refused to allow the amalgamation of his domain with Hindu India. He withdrew his protest to the Security Council under circumstances that have not been fully explained, although the Pakistani government, which sponsored it, accused the Indian government of holding him a virtual prisoner. The Pakistani government moved to revive the case during the spring of 1949.

PALESTINE: In April 1947 the British government requested the General Assembly to offer its recommendations regarding the future status of Palestine, administered by Britain under a League of Nations mandate. In November of that year the General Assembly, accepting the majority report of a special commission of inquiry, adopted a resolution calling for the partition of Palestine into two independent states, one Jewish and the other Arab, which were to be joined in an economic union.

HIGHLIGHTS OF UN ACTION IN PALESTINE



1947

APRIL, Britain places Palestine problem before UN

MAY, UN Special Committee on Palestine created by Assembly

NOV., Assembly voted for partition of Palestine

1948

MAY, British mandate ends; State of Israel proclaimed; Arab invasion begins; Assembly special session decides to send mediator; Count Bernadotte appointed

JULY, After fighting mars truce orders, Security Council passes cease-fire resolution

SEPT., Bernadotte assassinated
Ralph Bunche becomes acting mediator

DEC., Stanton Griffis appointed director of UN Relief for Palestine Refugees; Assembly establishes a Conciliation Commission; U.S., France and Turkey are named as members

1949

JAN., Armistice talk begins at Rhodes under Bunche

FEB., Egyptian - Israeli armistice completed

March-April, Transjordan and Lebanon sign armistice; Syria signs cease-fire

This resolution was, of course, merely a recommendation without binding force upon any government, but it asked the Security Council to take over if armed resistance developed. The legal points involved have been obscured by the maneuvers of power and domestic politics, in particular by a series of reversals in the United States position. But it would be valuable even now to get a ruling from the International Court of Justice on the central point: Were the Arab countries, after rejecting the General Assembly recommendation, justified in using armed force to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state under the terms of that resolution?

It is worth recalling that the British government formally accepted the resolution of the General Assembly, although it held fast to its determination not to use force to help carry out the recommendation. The British announced that they would give up their mandate on May 15, 1948. The United States, which had strongly supported the partition plan, then called a special session of the General Assembly a month and a half in advance of the termination of the mandate. At the special session the United States proposed the suspension of the partition plan and the establishment of a United Nations trusteeship as an interim measure. Rejecting this suggestion, the General Assembly finally agreed upon a substitute United States plan calling for the appointment of a United Nations mediator. This was approved an hour or so after the end of the British mandate. Meanwhile, President Truman surprised the world by giving *de facto* recognition to Israel a few minutes after its establishment.

The list of reversals of the United States position could be continued at length. A very complicated story may be summarized as follows: For a time Count Folke Bernadotte, the United Nations mediator, was able, as a result of the unexpected strength of Israeli forces and the unexpected weakness of the Arabs, to bring about an uneasy truce in Palestine. In September 1948 the murder of Count Bernadotte by Jewish terrorists alienated many members of the General Assembly. His final pro-

posals, bitterly attacked by the Israelis, surprisingly enough were endorsed by Secretary of State Marshall, but this stand was reversed by President Truman. In the end the General Assembly merely established a conciliation commission, in effect washing its hands of the Palestine question and leaving a final settlement to be determined by direct negotiation—as it has turned out, on the basis of the territory occupied by the military forces of the two sides.

Judgment of the rights and wrongs of the Palestine question will be left to the reader, but there can be no doubt of the fact that the prestige of the United Nations has been impaired by its failure to handle the problem decisively. It is true that the General Assembly partition resolution acted as a catalyst in bringing about the establishment of Israel; difficult though it is to fathom the aims of British policy, it is probable that there would have been no independent Jewish state at the present time if the Palestine problem had not been placed before the General Assembly.

Realistically, the shifts in United Nations policy toward Palestine followed the shifts in United States policy. As far as precedents for United Nations action in future crises is concerned, the essential point is that the fighting stopped when the Security Council in the summer of 1948 adopted a cease-fire resolution, based on Chapter VII of the Charter, containing a positive order. This was the basis of the authority subsequently assumed by Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, who became acting mediator after the assassination of Count Bernadotte, to supervise armistice negotiations. By April 1949 both Egypt and Trans-Jordan, the two principal Arab powers, had signed an armistice with Israel, and the fighting appeared to be over.

It can hardly be claimed, however, that Palestine was more than a doubtful victory for the United Nations. Fundamentally, the fighting stopped because Israeli forces proved too powerful for the Arab armies. Nevertheless, it is encouraging to note that when the United Nations, spurred on by a country possessing

the power of the United States, did issue a series of orders, these orders were obeyed. Similar firmness, particularly if it is exerted in a continuous direction, should produce equally good results in less complicated problems.

The Dutch and Indonesia

INDONESIA: The Security Council's apparent success in handling this particularly complicated problem was praised for a time as one of its greatest triumphs. After December 18, 1948, however, when the Dutch launched a new offensive against the Republic of Indonesia and the Security Council did nothing effective about it, Indonesia became a definite liability to the prestige of the Council. Only in early May 1949 did the situation change for the better. Then the UN Commission for Indonesia was able to send word back to Lake Success that both the Netherlands and the Republic had agreed to end the fighting—with the Dutch allowing Republican leaders to return to their capital at Jogjakarta and the Republicans agreeing to participate in a conference at The Hague.

The basic difficulty was to determine the exact status of the Republic of Indonesia. If it was a sovereign government, as it claimed, the Security Council had jurisdiction. But if, as the Dutch claimed, their measures were merely "police action" in a domestic concern, the Security Council did not have jurisdiction—unless, of course, it could be shown that the "police action" threatened international peace and security. The Republic's territory has never embraced the entire Netherlands East Indies. It was to be one of several units in the United States of Indonesia, which certainly would be a sovereign state, since the Dutch had promised to sponsor its admission to the United Nations. This point, it would appear, might usefully be submitted to the International Court of Justice, as the Dutch have suggested.

The Indonesian question was placed before the Security Council in the summer of 1947 when the Dutch launched their first offensive against the Republic. At that time they complied with

'HEADACHES FOR TEACHER'



Pease in *The Newark News*

the Council's cease-fire resolution, and eventually a Security Council commission obtained the acceptance of the Renville agreement in January 1948. The Dutch, however, resumed the offensive in December, after the Security Council had adjourned in hopes of taking a recess over Christmas. The Dutch alleged that the Republic had not complied with the Renville agreement, and that in any case it was unable to control Communist elements. The Republic replied, however, that the Dutch had been merely biding their time, and pointed to the fact that the Republic had just suppressed a Communist uprising.

These claims and counter-claims are no more confusing than the behavior of the great powers in the Security Council. Last December the Indonesian question was placed before it by the United States, which submitted a strong resolution calling for the return of the Dutch to their previous positions. This failed

to get a majority because of abstentions by the Soviet Union and the Ukraine. The Soviet Union then introduced a resolution which would have had a similar effect, although it invoked Chapter VII and denounced the Dutch, and the United States abstained. The Soviet resolution in any case would have failed to get a majority, but the abstention of the United States apparently reflected second thoughts in Washington; it was hardly practicable to sponsor Dutch participation in the North Atlantic pact while condemning Dutch behavior in the South Pacific. On the other hand, there was reason to believe that the State Department, working behind the scenes, was responsible for the more conciliatory attitude which the Netherlands government showed in the spring of 1949.

Lessons Learned

From the point of view of the United Nations as a whole, two lessons are to be drawn from its experiences with the Palestine and Indonesian questions. The first is that the Soviet veto, or more specifically the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States, is far from being the sole cause of the troubles of the United Nations. Obviously this is the most important single cause. But the Security Council has failed even in cases where the United States and the Soviet Union were in general agreement. Part of the blame in such cases is to be placed upon the intricacies of the Council's voting system, but the principal reason is the attempt by members of the Council, both large and small, to pursue their individual interests. Short of a millenium, this was an inevitable development. But this all too natural tendency should be borne in mind as one of the greatest obstacles to world government.

Secondly, the Palestine and Indonesian questions have thrown into relief a fundamental weakness in the powers of the Security Council: it has the right to use force to bring about a cease-fire or truce, but no power whatever to compel the parties to a dispute to agree to permanent settlement. The Council has, at

most, the power to name a mediator—in other words, someone who will try to get the two sides to negotiate. But since there is no means of imposing a solution, in the end the stronger side is likely to break off the negotiations and resort to the use of force. This is what happened in both Palestine and Indonesia when direct negotiations failed to produce a settlement within a reasonable period of time. On the other hand, it must be conceded that to give the Council power to compel the parties to a dispute to accept a particular settlement would go far beyond the aims of the men who drafted the Charter at San Francisco.

Membership Disputes

The disagreements between the Soviet Union and the Western powers are fittingly summarized in the history of applications for membership in the United Nations. It was established with fifty-one members, and eight others have been added: Afghanistan, Iceland, Sweden and Siam in 1946, Pakistan and Yemen in 1947, Burma in 1948, Israel in 1949. The Soviet Union has vetoed the applications of Austria, Ceylon, Eire, Finland, Italy, Korea (the Seoul regime in the United States occupation zone), Portugal and Trans-Jordan. Opposition by the United States and its supporters has brought the rejection of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Korea (the regime set up in the Soviet occupation zone), Outer Mongolia and Rumania. Opposition by the Western states took the form of abstentions, which prevented the candidates from obtaining the necessary seven votes in the Security Council.

Under the Charter, membership in the United Nations is open to all peace-loving states which are considered able and willing to carry out their obligations under the Charter, and the International Court of Justice has ruled that no other considerations should be taken into account. But the very applications for membership in the organization, which it was hoped would embrace the entire civilized world, now are a basis for disagreement.

3. Arms and the Atom

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN the United States and the Soviet Union is the basic reason for the failure to create an international force to keep the peace. It would be more accurate, in point of fact, to drop the expression "international police force" and stick to the language of the Charter, which refers merely to armed forces to be placed at the disposal of the Security Council. It might have been better to have a truly international force, wearing international uniforms, subject to the orders of the Security Council and the Security Council alone, a standing army for peace. But there were practical difficulties in the way. Apart from the cost of maintaining such a force, where would it be stationed? Would its overwhelming power threaten the independence of the smaller members of the United Nations?

Instead the Charter provides that all members of the United Nations furnish contingents at the call of the Security Council and that they maintain air units in a special state of readiness. But these would always be national contingents, and member states are not compelled to furnish them. The situation is analogous to that prevailing under the Continental Congress, when the American states, although theoretically obliged to supply troops, made individual decisions about the number of troops to be furnished.

For there is nothing automatic about the establishment of such an international force. Article 43, Chapter VII, of the Charter provides that all members shall provide "armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the pur-


pose of maintaining international peace and security," but it makes this subject to individual agreements with the Security Council regarding "the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided."

Question of Size


Before making individual agreements it was necessary, of course, for the Security Council to decide how many airplanes, how many carriers, how many divisions it needed, and what principle should determine the selection of contingents from great and small powers. This task was allotted to the Military Staff Committee which, the Charter declared, should be composed of the chiefs-of-staff, or their representatives, of the Big Five. Something like the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs-of-Staff seems to have been envisaged, although, in point of fact, the work has been left to less distinguished military figures.

The committee broke its silence in 1947 with a report to the Security Council stating that most of the armed forces provided for the Security Council should be supplied by the Big Five. Not mentioned officially, although this was the basic premise of the whole plan, was the understanding that the international force should be not of a size permitting its use against the Big Five.

The United States was in favor of a tremendous force, far greater than that employed for the initial stages of the Normandy invasion. Our generals and admirals wanted it equipped with our latest devices of modern war, particularly carriers and battleships. The Soviet Union wanted a much smaller force, and, since Russia lacked carriers and battleships, it did not want any of them included. The British, French and Chinese occupied a position in between, but in the end, after the United States proposals had been somewhat scaled down, sided with the United States. The United States, perhaps taking note of the Soviet Union's lack of carriers and battleships, insisted upon "compara-



NATIONS



GRAPHIC ASSOCIATÉS

tive" contributions. In other words, if one of the Big Five lacked carriers or ground divisions, it could make up for it by contributing something else. The three other members supported the United States, but the Soviet Union stood firm on the doctrine of absolute equality, unit for unit.

The Soviet estimate called for some twelve divisions, about 1,200 combat aircraft, and a vast array of cruisers, destroyers and submarines. As finally revised, the United States proposal differed mainly on the number of aircraft: 2,800 planes, fifteen divisions, six carriers, three battleships and corresponding numbers of support craft. It is not clear why the United States refused to settle for something approaching the Soviet figure, which obviously would be strong enough to coerce any small power. Soviet representatives have accused the United States and the other great powers of desiring to establish the nucleus of an international force which, in the event of war, could be used against the Soviet Union, even though it was not a United Nations force.

Other Issues

Even if agreement had been reached on the size and composition of the forces to be made available to the Security Council, it would still have been necessary to make individual agreements with the various countries, not only for armed forces but for the use of their bases—an expeditionary force is of little use without bases from which to operate. In addition there were such questions as the selection of the United Nations Supreme Commander, who would operate under the Military Staff Committee and the Security Council. There would remain the necessity of a Security Council decision—subject to the veto—to use this force against a particular country or group of countries.

The failure to establish a true international force is undoubtedly one of the principal weaknesses of the United Nations. Secretary-General Lie, as a stop-gap measure asked the General

Assembly to permit him to form a small guard force, which might at least be strong enough to prevent a repetition of such an outrage as the assassination of Count Bernadotte. A final decision is to be taken at the September 1949 session.

No International Atomic Control

The atomic bomb was still top secret while the United Nations Charter was being drafted at San Francisco, and the Charter therefore contained no provision for the control of the most fearsome means of destruction yet created by man. The destruction of Hiroshima a few months afterward confronted the United Nations with its most important problem. For the time being the atomic bomb conferred an inestimable military advantage upon the United States and upon any other country to which we were willing to supply the bomb. But once the "secret" of the atomic bomb was learned by other countries, the United States would lose much, although not necessarily all, of this advantage. A war in which both sides used the atomic bomb would very probably result in the destruction of civilization.

This appalling prospect gave a sense of urgency to the establishment of the United Nations as a going concern, and in January 1946, a few days after the General Assembly convened in London, it adopted a resolution establishing the Atomic Energy Commission. Canada, together with Great Britain, had worked with the United States in producing the bomb, and so Canada was made a permanent member of the commission, along with the five great powers. Each of the six countries elected to a seat on the Security Council was made a member of the Atomic Energy Commission during its term on the Security Council.

The United States plan for atomic control was presented by Bernard M. Baruch at the first meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission on June 14, 1946. In everything except one important detail—the proposal for restriction of the veto—the Baruch plan was taken from the recommendations of a remark-

able group of men, headed by David M. Lilienthal (now head of the United States Atomic Energy Commission), who reported to Dean Acheson, then Assistant Secretary of State, that conventional methods of control would not provide sufficient guarantees against the use of atomic bombs. The Acheson-Lilienthal plan therefore proposed that an international atomic authority should take charge of all activities involving the production of atomic energy. Thus no government, and no private interests in any country, would have the right to engage in the production of atomic energy for either peaceful or warlike purposes. Mr. Lilienthal and his associates believed that this was the only certain way of preventing violation of a control agreement. Efforts had been made in the past to "humanize" war by outlawing certain new weapons, such as poison gas, and these had a fairly respectable record of compliance, despite the use of poison gas during the first World War. But it was obvious that the temptation to use the atomic bomb would be incomparably greater and that the United States could not afford to take any avoidable risks in preventing the use of the atomic bomb against itself.

American Proposals

The United States proposals were as nearly fool-proof as it was possible for human ingenuity to make them. The proposal for an international control agency, with no veto to hamper its work, was the key point. Mr. Baruch demanded also that there should be no veto on the punishment of a nation found to be violating the agreement. Actually, once a major violation was discovered, it would be a matter of life and death for the other countries to make war at once upon the outlaw, and this was less important than the following points:

(1) International *control* over every phase of atomic production, beginning with the mining of uranium and thorium, and international *operation* and *management* of the dangerous phases,

HOPES AND REALITIES IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE

YESTERDAY'S HOPES

International armed forces




TODAY'S REALITIES

An unarmed UN




Atomic energy serving us all



Atomic energy our menace



National disarmaments



East-West tension and armaments



GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

i.e., the production of nuclear fuel—which can be used with almost equal ease in producing power or in producing bombs.

(2) There must be international control and inspection to make certain that every country was faithfully carrying out the agreement.

(3) The United States would not hand over either its atomic plants or its atomic bombs to the International Authority until it was convinced that the control plan was in effective operation. A stage-by-stage procedure was proposed whereby the countries taking part in the plan would gradually impart their information to the authority: first, they would disclose the location and extent of their deposits of uranium and thorium, the ores from which nuclear fuel is produced; this done, they would progress, stage by stage, through the various processes involved in the production of nuclear fuel; only at the very last stage would the United States turn over the “secret.”

French Suggestion

Of the seventeen countries which have served at various times on the Atomic Energy Commission, fourteen endorsed the basic provisions of the Baruch plan, and only the Soviet Union, Poland and the Ukraine held out against it. The plan approved by the commission, however, contains one important addition suggested by France—that the amount of atomic production to be allowed each country should be determined in advance in the treaties establishing the control plan, rather than left to be decided later by the international agency. This, of course, was intended as a safeguard against the possibility that a clique within the authority might decide to establish an unduly large number of atomic plants in one country and exclude another from its fair share. The United States, with its vast supplies of coal, oil and hydroelectric power, could get along quite comfortably without nuclear fuel, but for other countries, such as the Soviet Union and Australia, nuclear power may be of vast importance in the years to come.

Such was the United States plan, which was endorsed at the Paris session of the General Assembly, with the six members of the Soviet bloc voting in gloomy isolation.

Russian Proposals

What was the Soviet plan? As presented by Mr. Gromyko four days after Mr. Baruch's, and elaborated in the subsequent discussions, it placed primary emphasis on outlawing the atomic bomb. Otherwise control over atomic energy development would be left to each individual country. There would be an international control agency, and at one time Mr. Gromyko announced two concessions to the United States point of view—inspection would be by “international” inspectors, and the right of the veto would not exist in the international agency. For a time, moreover, Mr. Gromyko gave the impression that the Soviet Union would not insist upon outlawing the atomic bomb and destroying existing atomic bombs before an effective control was established.

At no time did Mr. Gromyko give any reason for the slightest hope that the Soviet Union would ever consent to the abolition of the veto in the Security Council, which, under the Soviet plan, would have the sole jurisdiction over the punishment of any nation violating the agreement. On this point Mr. Gromyko was adamant. The Soviet Union, he said over and over, is unalterably opposed to the operation of atomic plants by an international agency. He stated bitterly that this was an attempt to assure Anglo-American economic domination of the world and that the Soviet Union would never agree.

Although it is impossible to read the mind of the Kremlin, a moment's reflection is enough to explain some, at least, of its objections:

(1) International operation of atomic plants and, to a less extent, a true international system of inspection would make it impossible to keep the Soviet Union closed to the outside world.

(2) The Soviet Union can certainly count on developing the industrial know-how necessary to produce nuclear fuel within a

few years. It must suppose that the United States will not resort to a preventive war while it still has a monopoly of the bomb.

Deadlock between the Soviet view and that of the West has so far prevented any action on international control of atomic energy. Nevertheless, the Atomic Energy Commission, which suspended its work in the spring of 1948, resumed it a year later at the request of the General Assembly.

Disarmament

Looking back on the mistakes committed during the era between wars, the men who drafted the United Nations Charter were impressed by the fact that the democracies had disarmed at precisely the moment that the Fascist powers were rearming. The Charter therefore contains no express provision regarding a limitation in armaments. The general expectation at San Francisco, however, was that the establishment of an international police force, together with harmonious relations among the great powers, would make it possible to reduce national military forces far below prewar levels.

Partly because of this expectation, but also because of the crushing burden of our wartime expenditures and the outcry for a prompt return of GI's to civilian life, the United States took the lead in demobilizing its vast forces. Britain and the other democracies followed suit less rapidly. The Soviet Union also carried out a partial demobilization, but not on a scale comparable with that of the democracies.

At the autumn 1946 General Assembly the Soviet Union brought forward a demand for general disarmament, which it coupled with its previous demand for outlawing the atomic bomb. The proposal recalled the earlier Soviet proposal at Geneva for the immediate and complete abolition of national armaments, and it is difficult to believe that the Kremlin had in mind anything beyond a similar propaganda appeal. One fundamental difficulty for the democracies, and particularly for the United States, was the fact that they have relied heavily on

mechanized forces—large bombers and carriers—whereas the Soviet Union and its satellites have depended mainly upon mass armies. An army of 100 or 200 divisions could be reactivated very quickly, but the democracies would require years to restore their mechanized forces to war strength.

On the other hand, the United States delegation felt that it could hardly afford to reject some sort of disarmament resolution. The world had just emerged from the most devastating war in human history; in principle everybody was against large armaments, and after all the United Nations had been established to prevent war. Giving way to the insistence of the small powers, the United States and its supporters therefore concentrated upon removing the more tendentious aspects of the Soviet proposal. A compromise resolution, adopted unanimously on December 14, 1946, requested the Security Council to formulate practical measures for the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces, which were to include the principle of inspection.

As the United States delegation had suspected would be the case, the Soviet Union promptly used the resolution to support its contention that the recommended "practical measures" should apply to the atomic bomb—in other words, it wanted to supplant the Atomic Energy Commission, which meanwhile had adopted a report rejecting the Soviet proposals and accepting the basic principles of the Baruch plan. The Security Council finally established the Commission for Conventional Armaments with the limitation that it should not encroach upon the field of the Atomic Energy Commission, which had been given jurisdiction over the atomic bomb and "other weapons of mass destruction."

Another Deadlock

The Commission for Conventional Armaments, with the same membership as the Security Council, is the most futile of all the agencies yet created by the United Nations. At the insistence of the United States and other Western countries, it gave a high

position in its "plan of work" to the establishment of an international control system to "protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions." Since this was one of the points in the atomic control plan to which the Soviet Union took serious exception, this in itself made it unlikely that any real accomplishments would result.

Furthermore, the disclosure that the Military Staff Committee was hopelessly deadlocked on the international police force was another blow. After months of sterile meetings the commission, like the Atomic Energy Commission, finally decided to suspend its work in the summer of 1948. At the Paris Assembly the United States also proposed that its work be terminated, but the small countries were unwilling, and the Assembly finally adopted a resolution asking the commission to keep on trying.

The Soviet Union meanwhile proposed that the Big Five reduce their armed forces by one-third for one year and that the General Assembly outlaw atomic bombs without waiting for a control system to be set up. This time, however, the Soviet proposal attracted little attention and was buried in committee.

American Policy

In his speech before the General Assembly on September 17, 1947, Secretary of State Marshall stated the conditions which the United States considered a prerequisite for any concrete step toward disarmament:

"I say frankly to the General Assembly that it is the conviction of my government that a workable system for the regulation of armaments cannot be put into operation until conditions of international confidence prevail. We have consistently and repeatedly made it clear that the regulation of armaments presupposes enough international understanding to make possible the settlement of peace terms with Germany and Japan, the implementation of agreements putting military forces and facilities at the disposal of the Security Council, and an international arrangement for the control of atomic energy."

These conditions are still United States policy. Not only have they not been fulfilled, but a succession of disputes with the Soviet Union has led to the revival of conscription in the United States, constantly increasing expenditures on our armed forces and the North Atlantic pact.

4. Beyond the Veto

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY of the United Nations is similar in its functions to the League Assembly, but its decisions are taken by a two-thirds majority instead of by unanimous vote. On the other hand, whereas matters affecting international peace and security could be dealt with by either the League Council or the Assembly, the General Assembly can make no recommendations on an issue before the Security Council unless the Council requests it to do so. However, the General Assembly is authorized to discuss any question connected with the Charter without limitation, and its sessions have borne out Senator Vandenberg's prophecy that it would become the "town meeting of the world."

Despite the limitation on its powers, matters affecting international peace and security have dominated the General Assembly's meetings. Several times the sponsors of issues placed originally before the Security Council have transferred them to the General Assembly when the Council failed to take decisive action.

SPAIN: Poland placed the question of Franco Spain before the autumn session of the General Assembly in 1946, and the General Assembly adopted a resolution barring the Fascist regime from specialized agencies (it had already been barred from the United Nations itself) and calling on members to withdraw their ambassadors and ministers from Madrid. The results, however, were not impressive. Argentina, aware of the fact that Assembly resolutions have no binding effect upon member nations, promptly sent an ambassador to Madrid. The 1947 Gen-

eral Assembly failed to reaffirm the operative parts of the 1946 resolution, and a number of Latin American and Arab countries now have chiefs of mission in Madrid in defiance of the Assembly's recommendation.

GREECE: The Balkan question was transferred to the General Assembly after the Soviet Union vetoed the continuance of the Security Council's investigating commission, and the General Assembly then established a similar committee of its own. Whether the Security Council commission had the right to enter the territory of the countries concerned without the consent of their governments is a disputed point, but certainly the General Assembly agency did not. The Soviet Union refused to serve on it, and since Greece's three northern neighbors refused to admit it to their territory, it has had to confine its operations to Greek territory. Its report condemning the northern neighbors of Greece for helping the Greek guerrillas was approved by the General Assembly in Paris.

KOREA: The General Assembly's Korean commission, established at the request of the United States after a deadlock developed with the Soviet Union over occupation policy, has had a similar history. Instructed to hold a plebiscite in Korea to determine its future government, it was denied admission to the Soviet occupation zone but held the plebiscite in the United States occupation zone. The resulting Seoul regime was given *de jure* recognition by the United States, which sponsored its application for membership in the United Nations. The Paris General Assembly recognized the Seoul regime as the sole legal government in Korea, but later the application was vetoed by the Soviet Union.

INDIAN MINORITY IN SOUTH AFRICA: The Korean question was submitted direct to the General Assembly, without discussion in the Security Council, following a precedent set when India placed the question of discrimination against Indians resident in South Africa before the Assembly in 1946. South Africa contended that such policies were a domestic affair and therefore

not within the jurisdiction of the United Nations; the principal legal basis of a General Assembly resolution requesting South Africa to improve the treatment of Indians was that it was regulated by existing conventions between the two governments. In any event, South Africa refused to comply with the resolution, and in 1947 the General Assembly failed to reaffirm it.

SOUTHWEST AFRICA: Another case involving South Africa is that of Southwest Africa, administered by South Africa under a League mandate. It had been expected that all mandated territories which had not attained independence would be placed under United Nations trusteeship, but South Africa notified the General Assembly in 1946 of its intention of annexing the territory and has refused to comply with an Assembly request that the mandate be converted into a trusteeship. Whether South Africa will actually make the annexation is uncertain at the moment of writing.

Little Assembly

In addition to these unsuccessful attempts to settle international issues in the General Assembly rather than in the Security Council, the General Assembly at its 1947 session established an interim committee, more generally known as the Little Assembly, to consider such questions while the Assembly is not in session. The proposal came from the United States, which wanted to give the Little Assembly wide powers of investigation, and the Soviet Union promptly charged that it was an attempt to bypass the Security Council and circumvent the veto. After long debate the Little Assembly was established for only one year (it was extended for another year at the Paris Assembly) and was forbidden to take up questions on the agenda of the Security Council or to send out investigating commissions without the consent of the countries in which they were to function.

Its principal work thus far has been on the following topics: (1) on its instructions the Korean commission went ahead with the plebiscite in the United States zone after it was refused per-

mission to operate in the Soviet zone; (2) it submitted to the Paris session proposals for the elimination of the veto in membership applications and in cases involving Chapter VI of the Charter (peaceful settlement of disputes). Although it is boycotted by the six members of the Soviet bloc, some authorities believe the Little Assembly may yet develop into one of the most useful organs of the United Nations.

Apart from such international questions, the General Assembly has considered a wide variety of less controversial subjects. Its Paris session was outstanding for the adoption of a Universal Declaration of Human Rights, later to be supplemented by an international convention to which all member nations will be free to subscribe. The General Assembly also approved a draft convention forbidding genocide which, it is hoped, will be universal in its application.

Economic and Social Council

The Economic and Social Council, which had no equivalent in the League of Nations, is given jurisdiction under the Charter over the work of the United Nations and related agencies in carrying out a program for economic and social improvements throughout the world. The declaration on human rights and the genocide convention hold a high place among the achievements of the Council, which works through commissions on human rights, freedom of information, etc.

Assembly decisions to establish the International Refugee Organization and economic commissions for Europe, Asia and the Far East, and Latin America were taken on the recommendation of the Economic and Social Council. The Council also is in charge of relations between the United Nations and the eleven "specialized agencies," or affiliated international organizations, such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the Food and Agricultural Organization, and UNESCO.


A number of these agencies were established before the United

Nations itself, but it was intended that they would operate under what amounted to a joint policy. For a number of reasons, including the fact that all their headquarters were established away from Lake Success, this co-operation leaves something to be desired. In particular the failure of the Bank to make loans in the volume anticipated has hampered the execution of a reconstruction program under United Nations auspices; following the liquidation of UNRRA, the United States stepped into the breach with loans to Britain and France, which were followed by the five-year European Recovery Program for the sixteen participating countries. The Soviet Union's fight against ERP in the Economic Commission for Europe destroyed any chance that may have existed for the commission to play a part in carrying out the program. The Soviet Union is, in fact, a member of only two of the specialized agencies and served notice early in 1949 that it would withdraw from one of these, the World Health Organization.

Despite the lack of co-operation of the Soviet Union, the activities directed by the Economic and Social Council offer much hope for the future. Point Four of President Truman's inaugural address, pledging United States co-operation in the economic development of nonindustrialized areas, is in close accord with a resolution on this subject, adopted at the Paris Assembly, which is already being carried out by the efficient Economic Department of the United Nations.

The International Refugee Organization, founded to take over the activities of UNRRA in caring for refugees and displaced persons, filled a particularly pressing need that could hardly have been met in any other way. With the exception of the IRO, all these activities by definition are long-range, aimed at eliminating the basic causes of war. Admittedly the East-West conflict restricts the work of the United Nations in settling political disputes, but this is only an additional reason to support the work directed by the Economic and Social Council.

UN SPECIAL ACTIVITIES DOT THE GLOBE



GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

Trusteeship Council

The Trusteeship Council carries out functions similar to those of the League Mandates Commission. The Council, however, has wider jurisdiction: the lofty ideals of the trusteeship system

are made applicable to all colonies, whether or not they are United Nations trusteeships, and reports on the administration of all of them are to be submitted to the Council. The Council also is authorized to send out missions to make surveys on the spot in trusteeship territories. The first of these went to Western Samoa, administered by New Zealand, and its recommendations are credited with bringing about needed changes in the administration. Other trusteeships, all administered by the same governments which ruled them under League mandates, are: New Guinea, Australia; Ruanda-Urundi, Belgium; French Cameroons and French Togoland, France; British Cameroons, British Togoland, and Tanganyika, Britain.

Strategic Areas

The United States placed the Marshall, Caroline and Marianna islands, administered between wars by Japan, under the principal jurisdiction of the Security Council as a "strategic area." The effect of this is to prevent the Trusteeship Council from making inspections of the military installations in the islands; at the request of the Security Council, however, the Trusteeship Council assumed jurisdiction in 1949 over economic and social aspects of United States administration. Since the United States has a veto, there is of course no possibility that the Security Council could make inspections without the consent of the American government; no move in that direction has been made.

In addition to the former Japanese mandated islands, the pre-Fascist Italian colonies in Africa also are to be placed under United Nations trusteeships. The United States in 1945, and the Soviet Union three years later, favored placing all of them under a collective trusteeship supervised by the Trusteeship Council. However it appears that some will be returned to Italy for administration and that the others will be assigned to individual countries. The Big Four placed the question before the General Assembly in September 1948, and it was one of the dominating topics of the second part of the session at Flushing

Meadow. The Italian colonies represent a unique case for the General Assembly since the Big Four, in drafting the peace treaty for Italy, stipulated that they would abide by the Assembly's decision if they could not agree on one of their own within a year. Their failure to achieve a solution gave the Assembly this specific power.


5. Basic Issues

THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFICULTY confronting the United Nations is, of course, the fact that the great powers, and particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, have not worked together. Such great power co-operation was the basic premise upon which the organization was established, and without it the United Nations cannot hope to solve major political disputes. The situation is made more difficult by the fact that the area of dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union is constantly widening; as world powers, both feel their interests involved in almost every dispute that develops. The United Nations, as an organization, has been weakened surprisingly little by this conflict; for example, no Soviet veto has been cast to defeat a resolution involving Chapter VII of the Charter, applying to acts of aggression. However, the atmosphere of conflict inevitably limits the effectiveness of an organization which depends upon the co-operation of the two great powers.

In addition, it is worth pointing out other factors which play their part in the difficulties confronting the United Nations:

1. The language of the Charter is frequently vague. For example, it does not define the "procedural" questions which are not subject to the great power veto in the Security Council. (This was left to the San Francisco declaration by the Big Five, but some of the small powers insist that this declaration is not binding.)
2. Members of the United Nations have developed a disquieting tendency to divide themselves into blocs—a Latin American bloc, an Arab bloc, a Soviet bloc, etc.—complicating the work of both the General Assembly and the Security Council.
3. Whereas Geneva was only an overnight train journey from

UNITED BLOCS VS. UNITED NATIONS



GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

any European capital, Lake Success is a considerable distance. This, together with the length of General Assembly meetings, makes it hard for leading statesmen to attend.

4. The organization appears to be spreading itself out too thin. Employees at Lake Success number more than 3,000, far more than the League had. This fact, together with the requirement that jobs be distributed according to geographical representation, has made it difficult to obtain enough officials of the high caliber required.

5. As Secretary-General Trygve Lie has frequently pointed out, the headaches of the United Nations have been increased by the fact that the Allies have not agreed upon the peace treaties with Germany, Austria and Japan. Many of the issues with which the organization has been confronted arose directly or indirectly from this fact. The League of Nations, on the other hand, did not begin operations until the peace treaties had been signed. The fact that it was tied to the Treaty of Versailles created obstacles for the League, it is true, but the United Nations has had greater difficulties from the absence of a permanent peace settlement.

What can be done to improve the work of the United Nations? The veto is an obvious target, but it is after all a symptom and not a cause. The United States, Britain, France and China object to the abuse of the veto rather than to the veto itself. In any event, nothing can be done about it unless the Soviet Union withdraws from the organization, for an amendment to restrict the veto is itself subject to the veto.

The basic difficulty, in other words, is not that the Security Council would be unable to act if the Soviet Union committed an act of aggression—it was never intended to act in such a case—but that such an attack is now a possibility. Obviously, it is necessary to provide for joint action, independent of Security Council action or inaction. Mutual defense agreements are authorized by article 51 of the Charter, which safeguards the right of individual and *collective* defense against an armed attack, pending action by the Council. This is the basis of the Rio de Janeiro treaties, which bind the United States and the twenty Latin American countries to joint action; it is also the basis of the North Atlantic treaty, which binds together the United States and Canada in the new world and Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Portugal and Italy in Europe. Later a similar South Pacific agreement may be drafted.

The necessity for such agreements is, of course, an indictment of the present state of the United Nations and was responsible for the pessimism which developed at Lake Success early in 1949. These are grounds for the belief that a universal treaty of mutual defense, such as was first proposed in 1947 by Hamilton Fish Armstrong, would have been more effective, would not have been such an incitement to the Soviet Union, and would not have thrown such a spotlight on the weakness of the United Nations. In any case, it is to be hoped that the regional agreements fill the basic need to convince the Soviet Union that if it provokes a war it cannot expect to win.

If this message is understood in the Kremlin there should be

'POOL GROWING SMALLER'



Somerville in *The Denver Post*

time for the long-range program of the United Nations to produce results. The regional agreements may, in fact, act as a stabilizing influence. Despite the vicissitudes of the early years of the United Nations, the basic idea of a united world can never be laid aside. Thus there are good reasons for the belief that the United Nations will yet live up to the dreams of San Francisco.

A Future for the UN?

by Vera Micheles Dean

AT A RECENT SCHOLARLY gathering in London, at which the United Nations organization was being discussed, one of the British participants asked me with a quizzical look: "Do you mean to say that Americans *still* believe in the United Nations?" My automatic response was to say "Why, we have just *begun* to believe in it." And only after I had spoken did I realize from the pause that followed with what high expectations the United States, as compared with the rest of the world, has been viewing the UN.

This difference is due to a time-lag which it will take a real effort on our part to overcome. Between 1919 and 1939 some sixty nations—about the same number as now belong to the UN—participated more or less actively and wholeheartedly in the League of Nations. Even the U.S.S.R., which had remained aloof from most of the League's activities except in the field of health, had joined it in 1934 following the departure of Germany and Japan; and Soviet Foreign Commissar Litvinov made Geneva resound with eloquent pleas for collective security until Russia was expelled in 1939, following its invasion of Finland.

Of the great powers the United States alone was outside, steadfastly holding to its 1919 decision not to become a member of the League, although many Americans were intensely interested in various phases of the League's work and a few held office in the League Secretariat. Even in that period of American isolation from international organization there was probably more written and said about the League in this country than in na-

tions which belonged to the League. And a significant number of idealistic men and women worked unremittingly here to inform public opinion about the plans and achievements of the Geneva institution and to convince Americans that they should give it full aid and support.

Thus, paradoxically it came about that the nations which had been in the League from the outset, when high hopes were held for the future of international organization, had by 1939 become doubtful about the League's capacity to solve conflicts between nations and had developed a kind of resigned cynicism, while the United States, the principal outsider, was reaching a pitch of fervent belief in the efficacy of international co-operation as the only alternative to isolation.

American Hopes

It is therefore not surprising that it was the United States, under the leadership of President Roosevelt, which gave the impetus to discussions about the establishment of a new world organization dedicated to the prevention of war and the creation of conditions of stable peace through timely adjustment of economic, social and political issues that might otherwise lead to war. Nor did Roosevelt forget the tragic experience of Woodrow Wilson who had failed to win the backing of the Senate and the public for the League Covenant, principally because the Covenant was an integral part of the peace treaties with Germany and the other enemy countries. Great efforts were made to inform the American people during World War II about the need for and the proposed structure of the United Nations organization, and public discussion of the preliminary negotiations at Dumbarton Oaks was warmly encouraged. It was also decided that the United Nations would in no sense be linked to the peace treaties, and in fact would not even be asked to consider any of the problems directly resulting from the war, these problems being left for settlement by the victors.

In this attempt to create a climate of opinion favorable to

Senate ratification of the Charter of the United Nations, the potentialities of the world organization were so highly extolled that the American people came to expect far more from it than it could in reality achieve—and far more than was expected by other nations, which had had twenty years of experience with the limitations, as well as with the potentialities, of the League of Nations. With the best of intentions, the UN was oversold in the United States.

Then, when events showed that an international organization is not a universal panacea and cannot cure overnight the deep-rooted problems of history, a reaction set in which was just as exaggerated as the earlier hopes. People began to shrug their shoulders, to say that the UN was impotent, and to suggest a wide range of substitutes—from various regional arrangements outside the UN to the immediate proclamation of a world government. There was also a tendency to believe that Russia alone was responsible for the deficiencies of the UN, and that if Russia could be excluded, it would be possible to undertake effective international action and solve most of the outstanding problems.

Process of Reassessment

Today we are in the process of reassessing the strengths and weaknesses of the United Nations. Most of us no longer view it through the rosy spectacles of “great expectations.” We can see that membership in the UN does not automatically transform nations into saints, does not eliminate national ambitions and suspicions. Nor do UN members check sovereignty or considerations of “face” at the door of the Security Council and the General Assembly. Russia, being one of the two superpowers left in the world, and at the same time the standard-bearer of communism, often appears to be the villain of the piece in its insistence that it must have its way or at least prevent others from having their way. But experience has shown that less powerful nations, and nations not particularly swayed by ideological fervor, can be just as determined as the U.S.S.R. in opposing UN action that

they consider might be inimical to their interests—notably Britain on Palestine, France on Indo-China, Holland on Indonesia, the Union of South Africa on the status of Indians and on the South-west Africa mandate. Nor are lobby maneuvers and deals on votes limited to any one nation or group of nations.

Politics at Home and Abroad

Some critics of the UN are particularly disheartened because, they say, the UN has not “solved” many problems which have been placed on its agenda. It is wise to bear in mind, however, that in domestic politics, where we have the advantages of a common language, common traditions and common objectives, we do not “solve” our economic, labor, racial or political problems. What we do is to re-examine these problems from time to time, make adjustments here and there, but always with the knowledge that there can be no permanent solutions and that a settlement made today will have to be reviewed tomorrow.

It certainly seems unrealistic to expect more from ourselves, and other peoples, in international organization than we are able to accomplish in domestic affairs. Nor must we forget that it has not proved easy, through the centuries, to reconcile fundamental differences within nations, and that even the most advanced Western countries, like Britain, France and the United States, have gone through civil wars and revolutions before achieving a measure of stability. It is not surprising that international organization should pass through comparable crises in the brief period of its existence.

These aspects of the UN, however, discourage only those who had assumed that an international organization would act from higher motives and on a loftier plane than political assemblies in Washington or Kansas City, in Paris or Rome. We are quite tolerant here about log-rolling and pork-barrel operations in the nation's capital but are deeply disappointed when we discover that similar methods are used in international agencies. Some of us believe that a world government would correct this situation.

But if we want to improve it, we shall probably have to change not the institutions themselves, but the men and women who compose the nations that form part of international organization.

For, in the final analysis, there is no such thing as "the UN" which achieves this or fails to accomplish that—any more than there is a single entity that achieves or fails on the national scene. ("Congress," after all, is composed of Congressmen.) If we want to have improved relations between nations, or within nations, if we want less self-seeking and more social responsibility, we have to find some way to imbue human beings with these ideals. Neither the United Nations nor world government nor any system the fertile imagination of man might devise, is a self-operating machine. What we need is to train enough people who have the skill and understanding to make whatever machine we have at hand work—and then they will have ample chance to tinker with it and perfect it, as Henry Ford tinkered with and perfected the first automobile once he had learned how to put it together and make it run.

No Easy Answer

It is in this respect that the United Nations does the most valuable work—as the League of Nations had also done during the interwar years. For in the various committees of the UN, and in the international agencies clustered around it, men and women of widely differing political, economic and social outlook and traditions learn through actual experience to fuse their thoughts and actions into practical international co-operation. This is not an easy process.

It means that everyone concerned must learn to hear opposing opinions, to see the point of view of other nations, to adjust conflicting interests, to find a middle course between extreme positions. But this is in essence the process of democracy, which is already a great test of human capacities on a local or national scale, but is even harder to practice on the international scale.

Yet, as President Roosevelt said, the only way to learn how to work together is to work together.

Just as the peoples of dependent areas can become familiar with the institutions of self-government not through reading about them in books but only if they are entrusted with more and more responsibility, so nations cannot continue merely to discuss international co-operation. They must have more and more opportunities to co-operate and not merely in diplomatic or political fields, but on the innumerable problems of daily life—health, food, population, eradication of racial discriminations, and so on—which may sometimes seem unglamorous, but make up the stuff and substance of human existence.

Growth by Co-operation

This, in turn, means that all nations which are members of the UN should bring more and more of their business into the international organization, rather than try to limit the UN to perfunctory tasks. Each nation has something to contribute, as well as something to gain, from work in the UN—and not the least thing we all gain is the very valuable experience of reappraising our own activities by seeing them through the eyes of other peoples.

It is through this process, which often may seem tedious and barren of dramatic moments, that world government will gradually be forged. The greatest accomplishment of the United Nations, would, in fact, be to keep newspaper headlines in lower case. Human beings who have just gone through grueling years of war and civil strife are not hungry for crises and sensational victories by one nation over another. What they crave is the opportunity to live and to obtain adequate food, housing, clothing, education and leisure for themselves and their families. The test of any government, whether local, national or world-wide, is the extent to which it can fulfill the modest needs of mankind without curtailing human liberties.

It is well for all of us to bear in mind the words of Ralph J. Bunche, UN Acting Mediator in Palestine, who, after the successful completion of his task, said on May 9, 1949:

"I am confident that the United Nations, with all its imperfections and weaknesses, is the sole force in the world today which can issue reliable peace and freedom insurance. The United Nations, by dint of ever-persistent effort, is slowly moulding the kind of peaceful and free world that you and I wish to live in and wish to hand down to our children and grandchildren. The United Nations is the only bridge over which nations can come together to settle their differences . . . This United Nations bridge will be no weaker and no stronger than we, the people, make it. Let us thank God that in these parlous times we have it. And let us build it ever stronger."

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Of Human Rights**

by O. Frederick Nolde